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Even though governments may adopt favourable regulatory policies for renewable power generation, their 
ability  to  encourage  private  sector  investment  depends  also  on  the  presence  of  regulatory  governance 
institutions that provide credible long-term commitments to potential investors. In the case of Ontario we 
contend that, despite large market potential and comparatively strong regulatory incentive policies, weak 
regulatory governance is one factor that has accounted for the challenges in attracting and implementing 
large scale private investment in power generation at a reasonable cost. We find empirical support for our 
arguments  in  a  unique  survey  of  63  wind  power  firms  that  assessed  private  sector  opinions  about  the 
investment environment for renewable energy in Ontario. Compared to a range of factors, firms rated the 
stability of regulatory policy among the weakest aspects of Ontario‟s business environment. However, policy 
stability ranked among the most important factors in firms‟ assessments of the attractiveness of alternative 
jurisdictions in their location decisions. Subsequent interviews revealed that firms have responded to this risk 
in Ontario by explicitly pricing it into wind project financial models – implying higher wind power prices for 
ratepayers  –  and  by  directing  investment  funds  to  other  jurisdictions.  We  argue  that  policy  stability  in 
Ontario may be improved by devolving  greater decision-making authority to  regulatory agencies  in  the 
energy sector and by strengthening their institutional independence.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, several factors have converged to make wind energy a popular electricity supply 
option with policy-makers around the world. The growing political saliency of climate change, high oil and 
gas prices and the lure of „green collar‟ jobs have contributed to a proliferation of policy efforts aimed at 
encouraging  wind  power  development.  The  Canadian  province  of  Ontario,  one  of  the  most  populous 
jurisdictions in North America, joined the trend in 2004 when a newly-elected government directed one of its 
agencies to initiate a procurement process for renewable energy that resulted in 355 MW of wind energy 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) being awarded to private developers. This policy action was the first of 
several  measures  aimed  at  explicitly  greening  the  province‟s  electricity  supply  by,  among  other  things, 
shutting down coal-fired generation and introducing the first feed-in tariff for renewable generation in North 
America.   
 
However, unlike the experiences of other jurisdictions such as Germany and Texas where initial wind power 
investment goals were not only met but exceeded (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Langniss and Wiser, 2003), 
Ontario‟s performance has fallen short of stated objectives. The initial government target for 1350 MW of 
new renewable energy generation capacity to be operational by 2007 was missed: by January of 2008, only 
522 MW of renewable capacity were operational, or 39% of the original target (Ontario Power Authority, 
2008a). Furthermore, even though 1310 MW of wind capacity were contracted in competitive procurements 
during 2004 and 2005, only 54% was operational by the end of the first quarter of 2009, after the final 
commercial  operation  deadline  (October  31,  2008)  had  passed;  other  projects  were  either  delayed    or 
cancelled (Ontario Power Authority, 2009a).  
 
In this paper, we examine the factors that account for such mixed investment performance in the wind power 
industry in Ontario. While we consider the natural environment and operational conditions, such as regional 
labour and components supply, we focus our attention on the regulatory environment. Given the relative cost 
disadvantage  compared  to  traditional  fuel  sources,  renewable  power  technology  investments  depend 
significantly on supportive regulatory regimes.  
 
We distinguish between regulatory policies – which include tariff levels, incentive pricing schemes, financial 
subsidies, connection rights and so forth – and regulatory governance, which consists of the decision-making 
processes and administrative, legislative and executive institutions that determine specific policies (Holburn 
and Spiller, 2002; Levy and Spiller, 1994). Strong regulatory governance regimes consist of expert agencies 
that  operate  largely  independently  of  direct  political  control,  but  under  procedural  requirements  that 
safeguard  the  rights  of  stakeholders.  Such  regimes  can  provide  credible  assurances  to  industry  and 
stakeholders that policies will not change in an arbitrary or unpredictable fashion, for instance in response to 
new political or economic pressures, after investments have been made. Weak regulatory governance, on the 
other  hand,  is  characterized  by  a  more  politicized  policy-making  process  where  elected  ministers,  for 
instance, rather than agencies, have greater control over regulatory policies. In this type of environment, it is 
more  difficult  to  achieve  credible  commitment  to  future  investor  protection,  heightening  perceptions  of 
regulatory risk. As the time frame for investor returns lengthens – 20 years is not uncommon in infrastructure 
projects – the impact of regulatory governance in the assessment of the overall regulatory regime becomes 
more central. Since wind developers typically make around 80% of capital outlays during the first two years 
of projects, unexpected delays in generating revenue can significantly impact project returns, implying that 
long-term, predictable revenues are important for motivating investment (Blanco, 2009). 
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Here we argue that even though governments may adopt favourable regulatory policies for renewable power 
generation, their ability to encourage private sector participation will be limited by the presence of weak 
regulatory governance institutions. A comprehensive public policy approach to renewable energy reform 
thus requires an integrated assessment of regulatory policies and regulatory governance regimes. In the case 
of Ontario we contend that, despite large market potential and comparatively strong regulatory incentive 
policies, weak regulatory governance is one factor that has accounted for the challenges in implementing 
large  scale  private  investment  in  power  generation  at  a  reasonable  cost.  The  2009  Green  Energy  Act‟s 
amendments to the legislative framework have exacerbated governance weaknesses by increasing the scope 
of ministerial control.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section provides a brief overview of Ontario‟s 
wind energy performance while section 3 assesses the nature of regulatory governance in the province from a 
conceptual perspective. The fourth section presents the results of a survey of wind developers‟ perceptions of 
the  regulatory  and  operational  environments  for  the  wind  industry  in  Ontario.  Section  5  considers 
implications of our analysis for private developers and policy-makers.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Wind Power Investments in Ontario  
a.  Renewable energy investment targets 
 
In 2003, shortly after being elected to office, the new Liberal government publicly announced renewable 
power targets for Ontario, although the targets were not legislated: five percent of total provincial electricity 
capacity by 2007 (1,350 MW) and ten percent (2,700 MW) by 2010 (MoEI, 2004).  In 2006, as part of its 
Supply  Mix  Directive  to  the  Ontario  Power  Authority  (OPA),  the  Minister  dropped  the  2007  target, 
maintained the 2010 target and issued a new target for 2025. These targets formed the basis for the Integrated 
Power System Plan (IPSP), an exercise aimed at providing a long-term roadmap for the Ontario electricity 
sector, including renewable energy. In September 2008, a new Minister suspended the IPSP process, which 
had been launched in 2006, ordering the Ontario Power Authority to recommend, among other things, new 
renewable energy targets.  In practice, official targets have thus proved to be short-term rather than long-term 
planning goals. 
 
b.  Policy instruments 
 
In  order  to  achieve  its  renewable  power  objectives,  the  government  has  relied  on  two  main  policy 
instruments implemented by the OPA: competitive procurement auctions and feed-in tariffs. Under both 
programs, long-term PPAs were awarded to private sector developers by the OPA, which served as the 
government counterparty.  
 
The competitive auction model, termed the Renewable Energy Supply (RES) program, sought to acquire a 
pre-determined amount of wind capacity at the lowest possible cost and was targeted at large commercial 
developers. RES procurement rounds were initiated by the Minister through a directive to the OPA – and, 
before the OPA‟s creation, to the Ministry of Energy – rather than by the OPA itself. Developers with 
successful bids were awarded 20-year PPAs with partial inflation indexation. Although bids had to meet 
certain minimum criteria to move through to the auction phase, price was the primary selection criterion used 
by the OPA (OPA, 2008d). The first two RES rounds were implemented in 2004 and 2005, and contracted, 
respectively, for 395 MW and 975 MW of renewable energy capacity. A third RES auction for 200 MW was   
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also announced in 2005 but later abandoned. A new third round was launched again in 2007 and completed 
in January 2009. 
 
The feed-in tariff approach, originally termed the Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program (RESOP), was 
launched  in  November  2006.  The  target  audience  for  the  program  was  small-scale  developers  and, 
accordingly, imposed an upper size limit of 10 MW per project (OPA, 2006). In contrast to the RES process, 
all RESOP applications that met the eligibility criteria could in principle be approved and awarded a PPA 
(Ibid). Successful developers had three years to bring a contracted project into commercial operation, failing 
which they simply lost their contract without penalty or additional costs. If developers could invoke force 
majeure, that deadline could be pushed back to eight years. Although contracted energy costs were higher 
under the feed-in tariffs than under the RES auctions, the RESOP feed-in tariff program was expected to 
nurture  the  development  of  a  home-grown,  firm-level  base  of  renewable  energy  capabilities  within  the 
province.  It was also anticipated that the transaction costs of administering the RESOP program would be 
lower than for the RES program. In mid-2008, RESOP was suspended and a new feed-in tariff program was 
introduced for renewable energy projects in 2009, awarding projects different rates based on fuel, size and 
other characteristics. 
 
c.  Policy performance 
 
The government‟s initial renewable capacity targets established in 2003 provide one benchmark for assessing 
these programs‟ performances, since operational deadlines for the 2004 and 2005 RES procurements were 
set for 2007 and 2008, respectively. By this measure, investment levels have fallen substantially short of 
initial  expectations. At the end of the first  quarter of 2009, approximately  880 MW of new  renewable 
capacity was in operation, accounting for roughly 2.6% of total installed generation capacity in Ontario – 
approximately 65% of the 2003 target of 1350 MW by 2007 (IESO,  2008; OPA, 2009a).  Wind power 
accounted for 80% of all renewable capacity in operation (OPA, 2009a).
 ii  
 
Investments under the RESOP feed-in tariff program also substantially missed expected capacity levels. By 
the time it was halted in May 2008, RESOP had awarded contracts for nearly 1500 MW of renewable energy 
capacity (OPA, 2008b). The OPA announced in October 2008 that 10 RESOP wind projects accounting for 
12% of RESOP wind capacity under contract had been cancelled, although it did not comment on the reasons 
behind the cancellations (OPA, 2008c). By the first quarter of 2009, contracted RESOP capacity amounted to 
1412 MW, and the OPA predicted that nearly 1000 MW of this total would become operational by the end of 
2009 (OPA, 2009a). However, by the end of the fourth quarter of 2009, stated contracted RESOP capacity 
was revised to 1017 MW with only 188 MW, or 13% of the original contracted amount, having reached 
commercial operation (OPA, 2009b). The OPA did not provide reasons for the low levels of operational 
capacity relative to earlier targets or the 28% reduction in total contracted capacity. Yet due to the lack of 
performance guarantees in RESOP contracts, the OPA did not have any recourse if PPA holders decided not 
to bring contracted projects into commercial operation. 
 
Additionally, renewable energy investment levels in Ontario were relatively low compared to the levels 
achieved by U.S. states that had enacted Renewable Portfolio Standards: between 1999 and 2007, 23 states 
adopted legislation specifying targets for renewable energy capacity. In the years since adopting RPS targets, 
these states added, on average, 40 MW per 1 million state population of new wind capacity each year.
iii 
Ontario, by comparison, added approximately 13 MW per 1 million population of new wind capacity 
annually during the 5-year period until the end of 2008. 
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Beyond installed capacity relative to targeted amounts, another measure of policy performance is the price 
paid to attract private sector investment in renewable energy. All else equal, lower energy rates improve the 
competitiveness of commercial and industrial consumers as well as the disposable incomes of residential 
consumers. Although it is difficult to compare rates for renewable power sources across jurisdictions on an 
equivalent basis, the structure of the PPA contracts in Ontario was regarded as being highly favourable for 
developers: with a lengthy duration and government-backed purchase guarantee, financing risks were lower 
than in other settings with private or investor-owned utilities, implying a lower cost of debt or equity capital.  
 
Nonetheless, preliminary estimates suggest that prices paid to wind developers in Ontario were not lower 
than prices in the U.S. OPA information reveals that the RES I and II procurement processes yielded average 
rates of C$0.08/kWh and C$0.08639/kWh, respectively, while RESOP paid C$0.11/kWh for wind power 
projects.
iv  Table 1 shows a comparison of these rates with those in the U.S. for projects with similar 
commercial operation dates. After adjusting for exchange rates and federal renewable energy tax incentives, 
rates for RES I projects with 2006 and 2007  operation dates  were somewhat higher than in the U.S. 
However, further analyses that incorporate construction cost differences are required, before drawing firm 
conclusions about the magnitude of rate differentials and project returns between Ontario and elsewhere. 
 
This brief history of wind power development in Ontario indicates that policies directed at the sector did not 
achieve significant levels of new capacity in the initial expected tim eframe. The government failed to meet 
its own targets, despite implementing two new specific policy instruments designed to attract private sector 
investment. While permitting processes have proved to be one source of hold -up, we argue that a weak 
regulatory governance regime in Ontario has limited the ability of recent renewable energy policies to 
achieve their objectives.  
 
3.  Regulatory Governance  
 
a.  Regulatory governance frameworks
v 
 
Levy and Spiller (1994) argue that regulation is a “design” problem with two parts: regulatory governance 
and  regulatory  incentives.  Regulatory  governance  refers  to  the  mechanisms  constraining  regulatory 
discretion and resolving conflicts resulting from those constraints while regulatory incentives are specific 
rules dictating aspects such as renewable energy pricing and grid connection rights. Regulatory governance 
frameworks that provide a credible commitment to safeguard the interests of both potential investors and 
customers, particularly when unexpected events create political pressure to shift the balance of power among 
competing stakeholders, are best suited to attracting the levels of long-term private capital necessary for 
securing an adequate and reliable supply of electricity. Weak regulatory governance institutions, however, 
offering few or no credible assurances  against direct  or indirect  expropriation of private property, have 
difficulty in encouraging private investment.   
Credibility in regulatory governance arises from the structure of the jurisdiction‟s political, legal and social 
institutions. The crucial issue is to what extent the structure and organization of these institutions impose 
constraints  upon  governmental  action.    The  range  of  formal  institutional  mechanisms  for  restraining 
governmental authority include: the explicit separation of powers between the legislative, executive and 
judicial  branches;  a  written  constitution  that  both  limits  the  legislative  power  of  the  executive  and  is 
enforceable by the courts; two legislative houses elected under different voting rules; an electoral system 
calibrated to produce either a proliferation of minority parties or a set of parties whose ability to impose 
discipline on their legislators is weak; and a federal structure of power, with strong decentralization even to   
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the  local  level.  Utility  regulation  is  likely  to  be  more  credible  in  countries  with  political  systems  that 
constrain executive discretion.  Credibility is often achieved at the expense of flexibility, however.  The same 
mechanisms that make it difficult to impose arbitrary changes in the rules may also make it difficult to enact 
rules in the first place, or to efficiently adapt the rules in the face of changing circumstances.   
Legislative and executive institutions may also limit a country's regulatory governance options. In some 
parliamentary systems, for example, the executive has substantial control over both the legislative agenda 
and legislative outcomes. In such countries, if legislative and executive powers alternate between political 
parties  with  substantially  different  interests,  specific  legislation  may  not  be  a  viable  safeguard  against 
administrative discretion, since changes  in  the law could  follow directly  from  a change in  government. 
Similarly, if the executive has strong legislative powers, administrative procedures and administrative law 
alone cannot constrain the executive, who will tend to predominate over the judiciary in the interpretation of 
laws.  In this case, administrative procedures require some base other than administrative law. The regulatory 
challenge for policy-makers therefore lies not just in designing regulatory incentive structures that encourage 
economically  efficient  utility  operation  but  also  in  designing  regulatory  governance  frameworks  that 
constrain the political and administrative actors who have ultimate jurisdiction over the industry. However, 
designing regulatory institutions that are flexible enough to make balanced policy decisions in response to 
unanticipated events but that are also rigid enough to insulate policy from political pressures is a difficult 
task. Appendix 1 provides a brief overview of how the United States has approached the regulatory design 
problem. 
 
b.  Regulatory governance of renewable energy in Ontario 
 
In contrast to the United States, where multiple checks and balances confer a degree of autonomy on Public 
Utility Commissions, regulatory governance in Ontario is less insulated from political control, exposing the 
utility sector to a greater degree of direct political intervention (Hrab & Trebilcock , 2005; Wyman, 2008). 
The Ontario Energy Board (OEB), which has primary responsibility for regulating the electricity sector, 
operates under the oversight of the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure (MoEI). Since 1998, additional 
expert  agencies  have  been  created  with  specific  mandates,  including  the  Ontario  Power  Authority,  the 
Conservation Bureau, the Electrical Safety Authority and the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation. The 
Independent Electricity System Operator manages the wholesale electricity market and was established in 
1998.  Electricity  transmission  and  generation  functions  are  conducted  by  separate  state-owned  entities, 
Hydro  One  and  Ontario  Power  Generation.  With  multiple  agencies  either  regulating  or  operating  the 
industry, administrative responsibilities and capabilities are thus relatively fragmented. The risk that policy 
goals  are  not  successfully  implemented  increases  in  fragmented  structures  since  close  inter-agency 
cooperation and coordination are required. 
 
While the OEB oversees the broader electricity sector, the Ontario Power Authority has had a more direct 
role in the implementation of renewable energy policy. Since the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004, the 
OPA has been tasked with forecasting Ontario‟s energy requirements, developing an overall strategic plan 
for conservation, generation and transmission, and awarding long-term contracts to private generators to 
secure  sufficient  capacity  (Wyman,  2008).  The  OPA  has  thus  administered  Ontario‟s  RES  and  RESOP 
procurements.  
 
Although both the OPA and OEB are separate administrative institutions from the Ministry of Energy and 
Infrastructure, the Minister is  able to  exert a considerable degree of control  over  their decision-making 




First, OPA policy-making is subject to policy directives issued by the Minister, which require no legislative 
approval.
vi So long as the Minister remains within the scope of power defined in relevant legislation , in this 
case mainly the Electricity Act, affected stakeholders have no judicial recourse. Under sections 25.2(5) and 
25.32(4), the Minister has the authority, as approved by Cabinet, to control by directive the OPA‟s process 
for procuring renewable energy – determining specifically both the magnitude and timing of procurements. 
In addition, under section 25.30(2), the Minister can specify, through directives, the long-term renewable 
capacity targets included in the OPA‟s long-term planning forecast, the IPSP. Even though the OPA must 
review the IPSP periodically, section 25.30(1) further allows the Minister to order a review at any point in 
time. The Minister thus sets renewable power targets and retains the flexibility to revise them.  
 
Under the Green Energy Act (GEA), which received Royal Assent in May 2009, the Minister‟s legal powers 
were  significantly  and  explicitly  expanded.  The  Minister  can  dictate  whether  a  competitive  or  non-
competitive procurement process will be used (s. 25.32(4.2)) and select the pricing and economic factors 
used or achieved by the OPA (s. 25.32(4.3)). The Minister may also direct the OPA to establish measures 
facilitating  the  participation  of  aboriginal  people  and  groups,  in  order  to  facilitate  renewable  energy 
development. Furthermore, amendments to the 1998 Ontario Energy Board Act explicitly limit the ability of 
the OEB to make decisions independently of existing government policies on certain issues. Its modified 
mandate, under s. 1.1, now requires the OEB to promote electricity conservation, demand management and 
the use and generation of electricity from renewable energy sources in a manner “consistent with the policies 
of the government of Ontario”.
vii  
 
Second, ministerial control over agency actions can also be exerted through the appointments process. The 
OPA‟s board of directors is appointed by the Minister and “shall hold office at pleasure for an initial term not 
exceeding  two  years”.
viii Since  their  first  term  is  limited  to  only  two  years  and  reappointments  are  the 
prerogative of the Minister, the Minister can replace dissenting Board members within a relatively short time 
horizon – creating a strong incentive for OPA board members to account for the preferences of the Minister 
in their decisions.
ix  In contrast, appointment procedures in the U.S. and U.K. afford regulatory agencies in 
the utility sector greater independence from political bodies: Public Utility Commissioners in U.S. states are 
typically appointed for fixed, overlapping 5 year terms, longer than the terms of of fice for state governors 
and House representatives (usually 4 years and 2 years, respectively). In the U.K., members of the Gas and 
Electricity Markets Authority (the equivalent of the OPA or OEB) are appointed for up to 5 -year terms by 
the Secretary of State. 
 
The ability of a single minister to exert political control, subject to Cabinet approval, over central aspects of 
renewable energy policy-making outside the legislative process has fundamental consequences for the 
development pattern of regulatory policy over time. In particular, direct political control puts at risk the long-
term  stability and credibility of policy   since key dimensions may be modified at the discretion  of an 
individual minister by initiating directives to agencies or even simply by proposing to do so. Changes over 
time in ministerial policy preferences, which may occur in response to the appointment of new ministers or 
to sector-specific shocks and events, can thus lead to rapidly shifting agency decisions. In Ontario, t he 
repeated revisions  of long-term renewable capacity targets and of policy instruments such as RES and 
RESOP illustrate how sensitive regulatory policy can be to political forces in such an institutional regime.   
 
Original renewable energy targets were established through Ministerial public announcements in 2003 after 
the government was elected to office. These targets were  shortly effectively dropped when the Minister 
issued a directive to the OPA in 2005 to develop the   Integrated Power System Plan (IPSP)  containing   
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specific fuel targets, including for renewable sources of energy. However, legislation governing the IPSP 
ensures that its time horizon is relatively short since it is to be reviewed every 3 years and potentially sooner 
if “required by the Minister or the Board”.
x The OPA was ordered to proceed with its supply mix advice, 
which contained renewable capacity targets, in 2006 but it was halted in 2008 when a different Minister 
exercised his discretion by directing the OEB to suspend its formal review of the IPSP while the OPA was 
directed to “revisit” some of its renewable power targets with a view to increasing them (MoEI, 2008). By 
January 2010, official renewable capacity targets had still not been formally approved. Thus, in contrast to 
many U.S. states where targets are „hard-wired‟ into legislation and hence remain relatively stable over time, 
long-term renewable energy planning in Ontario has proceeded in a more piecemeal, unpredictable fashion.  
 
Choices over policy instruments have also been subject to unexpected alterations. The RES procurement 
process, which depends on initiation by the Ministry rather than the OPA, has lacked a transparent schedule, 
creating uncertainty about the pace and magnitude of future renewable capacity development. The initial 
third RES procurement of 200 MW of small-scale clean power, for instance, was announced by the minister 
in July 2005 (MoEI, 2005). However, after the OPA announced in late November of that year that the 
Ministry of Natural Resources had delayed completion of its Waterpower Site Release, it delayed the release 
of the final RFP and submission due date. Ultimately on March 10, 2006, developers‟ submissions were 
postponed indefinitely, effectively cancelling the RFP.
xi 
 
The other main renewable energy policy ins trument, the feed-in tariff, experienced similar unanticipated 
reversals. The RESOP feed-in tariff was initially implemented in November 2006 following a directive to the 
OPA but then was subsequently suspended by the OPA, acting under the oversight of a d ifferent Minister, 
less than two years later in May 2008. The RESOP program had largely failed to attract its target audience of 
small developers, instead attracting large scale commercial developers who divided up large projects into 
10MW sub components i n order to be eligible for RESOP contracts.   Nonetheless, after heavy industry 
lobbying, the Minister directed the OPA to reinstate RESOP solely for biogas projects in January 2009.  In 
late 2009, the Minister directed the OPA to create and implement an enti rely new feed-in tariff program for 
all renewable energy fuel sources. The  Green Energy Act further permitted the Minister to determine the 
magnitude of the tariffs in the program, making pricing an explicitly political decision. 
 
In summary, the presence of key policy-making authority in the ministry, coupled with the ability to issue 
directives  without  extensive  stakeholder  or  public  consultation,  establishes  a  relatively  weak  regulatory 
governance regime. Regulatory goals and policies are susceptible to revision in response to shifting party 
political priorities, lobbying by organized stakeholder groups or to changes in the general economic climate 
which may alter consumers‟ willingness to pay for a green energy premium in their rates. The tenure of 
individual ministers in the Ministry has also been exceptionally brief: since 2003, the average ministerial 
tenure period has been approximately 12 months, further exposing renewable energy policy to another source 
of  uncertainty.  Proclamations  about  long-term  policy  goals  and  intentions,  either  by  agency  heads  or 
ministers,  thus  lack  credibility  since  they  may  be  modified  in  the  future  with  relative  ease.  Table  2 
summarizes  how  ministerial  directives  and  announcements  have  shaped  the  development  of  renewable 
energy policy since 2004. 
 
4.  Survey Analysis of the Regulatory Environment in Ontario 
 
In order to further assess our contention that the regulatory governance regime is relatively weak in Ontario, 
we  conducted  a  survey  of  wind  developers‟  perceptions  of  different  dimensions  of  the  regulatory  and 
operational environments in the province. We implemented an internet-based survey during September and   
10 
 
October 2008 of the population of firms active in the Ontario and/or Canadian wind power markets. We 
identified 63 firms (utilities, independent power producers, and wind project developers) using multiple 
sources of information, including membership records from the Canadian Wind Energy Association, Ontario 
Power Authority databases, internet media searches and through our own direct conversations with Canadian 
and international wind power firms. Of the 63 firms we surveyed, 42 (67%) were headquartered in Canada 
and 21 were headquartered abroad (or their parent companies were). Approximately half of the firms (46%) 
were either publicly-listed or subsidiaries of publicly-listed companies. We received 29 complete survey 
responses, equating to a response rate of 46%. Of the 29 firms that responded, 20 (69%) were Canadian and 
12  (41%)  were  publicly-listed  or  subsidiaries  of  public  companies  –  a  similar  profile  to  the  overall 
population of firms on these dimensions. The median respondent firm had between 100 and 500 MW of 
wind power capacity in operation or under contract, typical of firms in the industry. More than 75% of 
respondents had direct experience in Ontario‟s wind power market, either holding a PPA with the OPA or 
else having participated in a bid for a PPA. 55% had experience in the rest of Canada, 31% in Europe, 21% 
in the United States and 14% in other regions. 
          
We asked firms two questions that provide the data for our discussion here: first, to score the level of 
importance of 15 different factors in their decision to become active in a particular wind power market; and 
second, to score their assessment of these factors in Ontario. The 15 factors consist of specific aspects of (a) 
the operational environment, (b) regulatory policies for wind energy, and (c) regulatory governance (see 
Table 3 for details).
 xii 
 
a.  Factors affecting the attractiveness of jurisdictions for wind power developers 
 
The second column of Table 4, which reports aggregated Importance (1 being not important and 5 essential) 
and Ontario Assessment scores (1 comparing very unfavourably and 5 comparing very favourably) for the 
three broad categories above, indicates that firms put greater weight, on average, on regulatory policies and 
regulatory  governance than on the operational  environment  in  their assessments  of jurisdictions.    Since 
governments  are  able  to  strategically  adjust  regulatory  policies  and  the  regulatory  environment  to 
compensate for weaknesses in operational or market conditions to attract investment, firms are likely to 
scrutinize the policy environment carefully. The finding that firms rate regulatory governance dimensions on 
the same level as specific regulatory policies is consistent with our argument that regulatory governance is a 
critical aspect in private sector decisions about where to locate investments.  
  
Table 5 provides a more detailed version of Table 4 with the results for each factor underlying the three 
broad dimensions. While we are cautious about drawing definitive conclusions on any single factor given the 
limited population and respondent sample sizes, we note there is a large numerical spread in Importance 
scores, ranging from a low of 1.96 to a high of 4.56 (on a scale of 1 to 5) in the third column, indicating an 
approximate rank order of different factors.
xiii We note several salient patterns. First, regulatory governance 
dimensions  ranked  near  the  top:  “Stability  of  the  policy  environment”  and  “Presence  of  long-term 
government target for wind power” ranked 2
nd and 4
th respectively – higher than specific regulatory policies 
such as the “Length of PPAs” (9
th) and “Government investment subsidies or tax incentives” (13
th). This 
suggests that potential investors look beyond immediate policy conditions to those that are likely to obtain in 
the future. Given the long-term, sunk nature of investments in the wind power sector, it is not surprising that 
firms prefer jurisdictions in which governments make long-term policy commitments that are perceived as 
being  stable.  Second,  with  the  exception  of  “Natural  wind  conditions”  which  rated  as  the  single  most 
important factor, operational factors such as the cost and availability of inputs in the region ranked at or near 




Third, project permitting and assessment factors generally ranked as being more important than operational 
factors. In the course of interviews with developers and IPPs, we found that post-PPA permitting delays 
represent a significant risk to project returns. Because PPAs typically have a finite duration (e.g. 20 years), 
the faster projects can become operational and generate cash flows, the greater the expected returns. Costs 
and cash outflows are heavily front-loaded for wind projects so delaying the generation of positive cash 
flows can significantly reduce internal rates of return. Thus, policy risks are exacerbated if activist NIMBY 
groups  or  communities  successfully  erect  local  development  roadblocks,  despite  central  government 
intentions of promoting investment. During an interview, a representative from a large global wind developer 
with operations in Ontario and several other jurisdictions commented: 
 
“There are a lot of different layers to a project of that scale, and permits and approvals form some of 
those layers. For projects to come in on time and on budget, all the layers have to move forward 
together as  planned and if one of them stops moving, than the whole project  can  get  stuck.  […] 
Permitting delays cause project managers a lot of anxiety.” 
 
b.  Attractiveness of Ontario as a jurisdiction for wind power investment 
 
The  fourth  column  of  Table  5  reports  firms‟  assessments  of  Ontario‟s  performance  on  each  of  the  15 
dimensions.
 The average score of 2.61 across all dimensions suggests that Ontario compares marginally less 
favourably to other jurisdictions (a score of 3 would put Ontario on par with other jurisdictions in which 
respondents had experience).  
 
Regulatory policies concerning PPAs with the OPA rated as the strongest aspects of the policy environment 
in Ontario, with the length of the PPA and transparency of PPA bidding judged to be equivalent or more 
favourable  than  in  other  jurisdictions.  This  result  is  in  line  with  our  discussions  with  developers  who 
generally viewed Ontario‟s regulatory incentives for wind power in a positive light. A representative from 
the U.S. division of a global wind IPP commented that: 
 
“For wind development, the strength of your revenue and the quality of your off-taker matter a lot. In 
Ontario, your off-taker is a crown corporation [the OPA]. In the U.S., unless you get a contract from an 
investment-grade utility, financing can be a problem. So in Ontario you don‟t have that problem.” 
 
In general, Ontario scores relatively well on operational conditions: with the exception of the natural wind 
environment which ranked below average, other operational aspects such as construction costs and labour 
availability scored above average. The significant size of the market was also perceived as being a positive 
feature. As one developer without a PPA in Ontario noted: 
 
“We view the Ontario market as a very attractive market. We think there is a lot of potential – with the 
coal plant retirements and the new Minister of Energy increasing the IPSP wind power targets. And 
Ontario is where the load is. So yes, we very much want to be active in Ontario.” 
 
In contrast to operational and regulatory policy issues, the assessment of the regulatory governance regime in 
Ontario was considerably less favourable. The bottom-ranked three factors were all governance aspects. 
“Stability of the policy environment” ranked 14
th, “Coordination between government-related agencies” 15
th 
and  “Ease  of  obtaining  development  approvals”  13
th.  Each  rated  less  favourably  on  average  than  other 




The low rating for policy stability is consistent with the „start-stop‟ history of competitive procurements and 
the feed-in tariff programs, as well as with the halting long-term industry planning process, driven in part by 
the frequent succession of energy ministers and new directives. Concerns about policy risks were often 
expressed during our interviews with firms. One senior executive at a global independent power producer 
with operations in the U.S. and Europe commented: 
 
“I would say Ontario is one of the highest risk jurisdictions in North America and it‟s definitely not 
for the faint of heart. In comparison to some of the places where we do business in the U.S. I would 
say it‟s terrible. The probability of project success is one of the lowest.” 
 
A representative from a Canadian-based utility expressed similar views: 
 
“Our board considers Ontario a risky jurisdiction. Ontario! […] in fact, Mexico is more stable. So 
yes, it‟s a concern, we consider the province to be a risky jurisdiction to invest in.” 
 
Difficulties with “[e]ase of obtaining development approvals”, which received the third lowest score, were 
also seen by interviewed developers and IPPs as being closely connected with policy risks. Local opposition 
groups appear to have utilized the lack of a centralized planning process or guidelines in Ontario to pressure 
municipal politicians into enacting local rules that effectively rendered projects unviable or delayed zoning 
applications. A representative from a large international IPP with activities in Ontario told us the following: 
 
“For municipalities, what will often happen is that out of 3000 people, five are opposed. But those 
five are able to use all kinds of administrative and planning measures to block projects.” 
 
The presence of a long-term government target for wind power rated more favourably than other dimensions 
of the governance environment. This may have reflected the government‟s repeatedly stated commitment to 
renewable energy even without enshrining it in legislation.  
 
Overall, while we are not able to undertake a comprehensive statistical analysis of the factors driving 
wind investment, the survey and interview results are consistent with our expectation that regulatory 
governance is an important issue for private sector developers in their location decisions, and that the 
governance regime in Ontario presents policy risks, stemming both from the absence of a provincial-level, 
stable policy framework and from locally-enacted road blocks. We find a marked juxtaposition between 
the ranking of Importance and Assessment factors. Ontario fares especially poorly on the three factors that 
wind power firms rated as being the most important in their location decisions – stability of the policy 
environment, availability of transmission capacity and natural wind conditions – providing some insight 
into why installed capacity has not met government targets. Future research may more precisely identify 
the reasons for Ontario‟s mixed performance than is possible here, for instance by statistically testing data 
on investment patterns and regulatory governance in a large sample of jurisdictions that includes Ontario. 
 
5.  Implications for Renewable Energy Developers and for Policy Reform 
  
a.   Investment levels 
 
A widely held belief among firms that emerged during our interviews was that Ontario was a wind market 
with  significant  potential.  Moreover,  the  PPA with  the  OPA  was  noted  as  conferring  on  Ontario  an   
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important advantage over many U.S. jurisdictions. However, perceptions of regulatory risk have led to 
caution  in  investment  plans.  Although  no  firms  stated  they  would  stay  out  of  Ontario  entirely, 
representatives from two international IPPs, one with operations in Ontario and the other without, told us 
that,  given  a  constrained  pool  of  capital,  Ontario  would  not  rank  among  the  top  North  American 
jurisdictions where their firms would chose to deploy that capital. A representative from a U.S.-based IPP 
with wind operations in different parts of Canada qualified the Ontario market as a “U.S. Production Tax 
Credit hedge”, stating that his firm would seriously look at Ontario only if the PTC expired.
xiv Ontario 
would thus likely attract higher levels of investment, especially from globally active firms, if perceived 
policy risks were lower. 
 
b.  Procurement bid pricing 
 
An alternative reaction for wind developers is to incorporate expected policy risks into ex ante financial 
assessments and to adjust bid prices during procurement exercises accordingly. A representative from a 
large utility with wind operations in various parts of the country told us that his company‟s board of 
directors  viewed  Ontario  as  a  risky  jurisdiction,  and  that  a  premium  was  being  priced  into  project 
valuation models. A Canadian  IPP with operations in Ontario and the rest of  the country shared the 
following: 
 
“For the first time in RES III, we‟ve had to price in these risks. In RES I we definitely did not. But 
for RES III, we thought: „Ok, how much have we spent on those permit delays, on dealing with 
communities, etc‟, and we included that in our pricing. It‟s very back of the envelope, but it‟s 
definitely priced.” 
 
c.  Lobbying and government relations 
 
Given the central role of the Minister in formulating and revising renewable energy policy, a further 
implication  for  developers  is  to  devise  lobbying  and  government  relation  strategies.  Continual 
engagement at the ministry, through meetings with key staff advisors and Ministers, and through the 
sharing of expertise and information with the Ministry, will ensure industry interests are voiced in pivotal 
policy-making  arenas.  The  2009  ministerial  directive  reinstating  RESOP  for  biogas  projects  is  one 
example  of  how  industry  lobbying,  in  this  case  of  both  the  Premier‟s  and  Minister‟s  offices,  was 
instrumental in safeguarding firms‟ interests. Participation in agency consultations provides further voice 
in discussions about policy options and agency recommendations to the Minister. Large firms may have 
the scale to justify hiring dedicated government relations staff to represent their positions, while smaller 
firms are more likely to rely on industry associations such as the Canadian Wind Energy Association to 
advocate collectively on their behalf. In each case, such activities create additional costs for developers 
that will lower investment returns from productive assets unless incorporated into ex ante procurement 
bids.  
 
The enhanced need for developing strong political relations is likely to act as a barrier to out-of-province 
and foreign developers since such firms typically do not have pre-established connections and are less 
familiar  with  the  political  environment.  Conversely,  in-province  firms,  or  those  with  strong  political 
connections, will have an advantage over the less well connected. 
 
d.  Regulatory reform 
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Improving policy stability and thereby reducing regulatory risk may be achieved by undertaking reforms in 
the regulatory governance structure rather than in specific policies – e.g. in the institutional processes by 
which policies are formulated and implemented. Reforms that „hard wire‟ policy commitments would reduce 
the degree of political discretion that underlies observed aspects of policy instability. One option would be to 
enshrine  specific  policies  in  legislation.  Even  though  the  majority  party  in  the  Legislature  controls  the 
legislative agenda, the legislative process provides opportunities for public debate and consultation that are 
not required for ministerial directives. Extensive consultation has the benefit of reducing the risk of policy 
errors  since  multiple  parties  have  an  opportunity  to  provide  information  on  policy  consequences  and 
alternatives  that  may  not  have  been  anticipated  by  the  sponsoring  Ministry.  Enacting  legislation  also 
demands time and resources from the initiating parties, implying that once enacted, legislation is not easily 
reversed or modified. Specific long-term renewable power capacity or electricity generation sector emissions 
targets would be candidates for legislation, as has been the case in many U.S. states.  
 
A  second  approach  to  stabilizing  policy  over  time  would  be  to  strengthen  agency  independence  from 
political control, as has been the practice in other jurisdictions such as the U.S. and U.K. that have also 
encouraged private sector investment in the utility sector. Further policy decision-making authority could be 
conferred on the OPA or OEB, subject to administrative procedural requirements, but without the need for 
explicit  ministerial  initiation  or  approval.  For  instance,  the  authority  to  establish  a  renewable  capacity 
procurement schedule – including magnitude and timing of contracts – could be delegated solely to the OPA 
rather than permitting the Minister to control such actions through directives. Independence from political 
pressures would be further enhanced by reforming appointment processes: lengthening terms of appointment 
to fixed five year periods, and staggering the appointments of board members would insulate the OPA or 
OEB from immediate political exigencies. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Ontario, like other North American and international jurisdictions, has sought to increase the share of its 
electricity  supply  mix  provided  by  renewable  energy  resources,  especially  wind.  Like  many  other 
governments, Ontario policy-makers have opted to leave the development of the wind power portfolio to the 
private sector by incenting investment through specific regulatory programs. However, while the provincial 
strategy has ostensibly been successful in initially generating a high degree of private interest, headline data 
about contracted wind capacity masks underlying regulatory governance problems that have ultimately led to 
project  and  program  cancellations  and  delays  and,  ultimately,  lower  investment  levels  than  initially 
anticipated. We expect that without reforms in regulatory governance, the province will struggle to meet its 
renewable power capacity objectives  at a reasonable cost to the ratepayer  – especially given the strong 
competition for renewable assets, technologies and investments from U.S. states where utilities have legally 
binding obligations to fulfill Renewable Portfolio Standards.  
 
Existing  research  on  renewable  power  policy  largely  focuses  on  the  relative  performance  of  different 
regulatory  incentive  tools,  most  often  pitting  feed-in  tariff  systems  against  competitive  auction  models. 
However, based on insights provided by Holburn and Spiller (2002) and Levy and Spiller (1994), we argue 
that, as with other utility industries, wind power investors are also concerned with regulatory governance and 
the future stability of extant policies. Here we conduct a unique industry survey that provides some of the 
first empirical support for the proposition that utility investors are as concerned about regulatory governance 
as they are with specific regulatory policies. Although the survey is limited by its sample size, the survey 
results, and the interviews with wind power developers and IPPs, together provide supportive evidence for 
our arguments in the context of the regulatory regime in Ontario: despite favourable operational and market   
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conditions, unstable policy and weak credibility have held back some investment and pushed up procurement 
bid pricing. These governance problems have ultimately led the Ontario government to compensate with the 
introduction of stronger regulatory incentives, such as increased tariff prices and an enlarged feed-in tariff 
program, in order to achieve its policy objectives.  
 
Our analysis leads us to conclude that Ontario would benefit by formalizing its wind energy strategy through 
legislation that reforms regulatory governance. First, long-term targets for renewable fuel capacity levels or 
carbon emissions from power generation should be legislated and the ability of the Minister to revise such 
targets restricted. Second, agencies such as the Ontario Power Authority or Ontario Energy Board, rather 
than the Minister, should have independent authority to set key dimensions of policy such as procurement 
schedules and rates paid to owners of renewable generation assets. Doing so will reduce the risk that policy 
development is especially sensitive to political pressures, thereby increasing the attractiveness of Ontario as a 
location for wind power investments. This conclusion is consistent with Blanco‟s (2009: 1380) statement that 
“the best  policy measure by far [for reducing capital  finance costs] consists of creating a stable policy 
framework, which improves the prediction of income streams for a wind farm”.  
 
Besides considerations of low carbon electricity generation, the success of a wind energy policy can have 
positive industrial development ramifications. As noted by the U.S. Department of Energy‟s office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy, there have been growing investments in wind manufacturing capacity in 
the U.S. since 2006 (EERE, 2008). The ability to incent investment in wind power generation can therefore 
stimulate additional investment in the industry supply chain, creating further economic growth. While a full 
analysis of the factors affecting location decisions for wind turbine manufacturing firms is beyond the scope 
of this paper, we note that some of the jurisdictions that have attracted significant manufacturing spin-offs 
from  their  wind  energy  strategies,  such  as  Germany  and  Texas,  have  established  stable  regulatory 
frameworks based in comprehensive legislation and specific commitments to renewable capacity targets. 
Thus, while we argue that formalizing provincial wind energy strategy through legislation would strengthen 
the investment environment for generators, additional investment within the industry supply chain in the 
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U.S. rate paid for 
wind energy 
(US$/kWh avg)  
(# of projects) 
Ontario 
Renewable 













2006  0.048 (14)  0.08  0.08639  0.11 
2007  0.045 (21)  0.08  0.08639  0.11 




Source: authors’ compilation  
Table 2: Changes in Ontario Renewable Energy Policies 
 
 Year  Minister  Renewable Energy Capacity RfPs  Feed-in Tariffs  Renewable Capacity Targets 
2004  Dwight Duncan    Ministry initiates procurement of 
300 MW (RES I) 
    Government documents (e.g. RES I 
RfP) outline targets for 1350 MW 
of renewable energy capacity by 
2007 and 2700 MW by 2010 
2005  Dwight Duncan    Minister announces 200 MW RfP 
for projects less than 20 MW 
  Minister directs OPA to procure 
1000 MW for projects greater than 
20 MW (RES II) 
  Minister directs OPA to 
develop new feed-in tariff 
program (RESOP) 
  Minister requests OPA to 
recommend targets for new 
renewable energy capacity by 
2015, 2020 and 2025 while taking 
into account existing targets for 
2007 and 2010 
2006  Donna Cansfield    OPA postpones 200 MW RfP 
announced in 2005 
  Minister directs OPA to 
implement RESOP 
 
  Dwight Duncan        Minister directs the OPA to create 
the Integrated Power System Plan 
with the explicit goal of increasing 
renewable capacity by 2700 MW 
by 2010 and 15700 MW by 2025    
2007  Dwight Duncan    Minister directs OPA to procure 
2000 MW of projects greater than 
10MW to become operational by 
2015, and directs the OPA to 
initiate a first tranche of RfPs 
toward that goal by year‟s end for 
500 MW  (RES III) 
  Minister directs OPA to modify 
RESOP program to include 
small hydro projects in northern 
Ontario 
 
2008  Gerry Phillips      OPA suspends RESOP   
  George Smitherman         Minister directs the OPA to 
“revisit” its IPSP targets with a 
view to increasing the use of 
renewable energy  
2009  George Smitherman      Minister directs OPA to re-
instate RESOP for biogas 
projects only 
 
  George Smitherman      Minister directs OPA to create 
new feed-in tariff program  
 
Source: authors’ compilationTable 3: Survey Questions for Wind Energy Firms 
 
 
“How does your company rank the following criteria when deciding whether to become active in a wind 
market: (1) Not Important; (2) Somewhat Important; (3) Important; (4) Very Important or (5) Essential?” 
 
“How does Ontario compare to other jurisdictions where your company has been active in wind power 
development based on the following criteria? (0) Not Applicable; (1) Very Unfavourably; (2) Somewhat 
Unfavourably; (3) Roughly the Same; (4) Favourably; (5) Very Favourably.” “Not Applicable” responses 
were not counted toward the average scores. 
 
Operational Conditions 
1.  Natural wind conditions 
2.  Local availability of engineering and construction expertise specific to wind power  
3.  Proximity to equipment manufacturers and suppliers  
4.  Costs for construction, engineering and technical services 
 
Regulatory Policies 
5.  Level of government investment subsidies or tax incentives for wind power generation   
6.  Length of the PPA  
7.  Availability of transmission capacity for the foreseeable future  
8.  Transparency of the PPA bidding and award process  
 
Regulatory Governance and Process 
9.  Stability of the policy environment 
10. Presence of a hard long-term government target for wind power 
11. Coordination between all government-related agencies involved in grid connection, environmental 
assessments, PPA processes, development and other permits 
12. Ease of obtaining grid connection approval 
13. Ease of obtaining environmental assessment approval 
14. Ease of obtaining development approvals from municipal governments and local communities 
(including First Nations groups) 
15. Ease of obtaining rights to land 
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Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
Source: authors’ compilation




Regulatory governance and process  3.96  2.36 
Regulatory policies  3.87  2.78 
Operational conditions  3.07  2.88   
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Rank  Factor  
Importance of 







1  Natural wind conditions  4.56  2.50  =9 
2  Stability of the policy environment  4.38  2.09  14 
3  Availability of transmission capacity 
for the foreseeable future  4.33  2.14  =11 
4  Presence of a long-term 
government target for wind power  4.14  2.91  =5 
5  Transparency of the PPA bidding 
and award process  4.07  3.19  2 
6  Ease of obtaining grid connection 
approval  4.07  2.32  =11 
7  Ease of obtaining development 
approvals from municipalities  3.93  2.29  13 
8  Ease of obtaining environmental 
assessment approval  3.90  2.41  =9 
9  Length of the PPA  3.72  3.33  1 
10  Coordination between all 
government-related agencies  3.69  1.59  15 
11  Ease of obtaining rights to land  3.62  2.91  =5 
12  Costs for construction, engineering 
and technical services  3.44  2.95  4 
13  Government investment subsidies 
or tax incentives  3.34  2.45  8 
14  Availability of engineering and 
construction expertise  2.41  3.14  3 
15  Proximity to equipment 
manufacturers and suppliers  1.96  2.91  7 
Average 
(N=29 completed surveys)  3.70  2.61     
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Appendix 1: Regulatory Governance of the Utility Sector in the United States 
In the United States, the country with the longest history of private ownership in the utilities sector, the 
regulatory solution that emerged in the electricity industry during the beginning of the twentieth century was 
to move regulation one step up from local politics.  Regulatory authority over electric distribution utilities 
was moved away from politicized municipal environments and toward state-wide independent administrative 
agencies (state Public Utility Commissions, hereafter “PUCs”) with statutory authority to monitor utility 
performance and to set  final rates. Since PUCs normally operate in systems where legislative power is 
divided among the executive and two legislative chambers, they generally have substantial autonomy to 
determine regulatory policy without the threat of legislative override or overwhelming political interference. 
While  PUCs  operate  under  broad  statutory  objectives  (“reasonableness”  is  the  typical  criterion  for  rate 
levels) and have the power to disallow imprudent or anti-competitive managerial behaviour, their decisions 
cannot  be  made  in  an  arbitrary  fashion.  First,  the  evolution  of  constitutional  interpretation  ensures  that 
utilities are allowed to earn a fair return on their investments. Second, due process requirements enshrined in 
states‟ Administrative Procedure acts also ensure that PUC rulings must be based on the facts and evidence 
of the case (Vanden Bergh, 2000).
 In the event of disputes, utilities are able to challenge the PUC on both 
statutory  and  constitutional  grounds  in  state  and  federal  courts  which,  given  the  nature  of  judicial 
appointments, normally operate independently of the political establishment (Spiller and Vanden Bergh, 
2003). In the electricity sector, a second level of protection against local opportunistic behaviour resides in 
that wholesale electricity generation markets, given the interconnection across states of transmission grids, 
are regulated at the federal rather than at the state level. Given their independence and nation-wide range of 
interests, federal agencies are less able to be manipulated by local or state officials. Private investors thus 
have some assurance that regulatory policy will be protected from immediate political pressures as well as 
from agency arbitrariness.  
Implementing regulatory reforms at legislative and administrative levels in the U.S. is frequently a difficult 
and lengthy exercise, lending considerable weight to status quo policies. First, as a result of the nation‟s 
federal  structure,  as  well  as  of  its  separation  of  political  powers,  legislative  policy  changes  require  the 
agreement of multiple institutions, all of which are subject to judicial review. Thus, in the presence of 
divergent  interests  it  can  be  difficult  to  find  mutually  preferable  new  proposals.  Consequently,  drastic 
changes in regulatory policy – those that entail a redistribution of wealth among competing interest groups – 
are difficult to implement as the losing coalition will lobby against adoption.  Thus, when political interests 
are fragmented, dramatic legislative proposals tend either to be rejected or else subsequently moderated.  
Second, while the U.S. system of political checks and balances insulates interest groups against unfavorable 
legislative reforms, the logic of political delegation also ensures that regulatory agencies do not rapidly 
implement substantial policy changes against the wishes of their political principals through administrative 
means. A variety of governance mechanisms are used to safeguard against rapid administrative decision 
making which may distort legislators‟ preferences.  Legislators undertake committee hearings, appointments 
of officials are reviewed, and agencies are subject to administrative procedures and due process requirements 
that provide interest groups with a role in decision-making procedures.  Thus, even if the threat of legislative 
override is not credible, agency decisions cannot drift too far too fast from the status quo.  
The combination of multiple legislative veto points, administrative controls and independent judicial review 
in the U.S. tends to insulate status quo public policies and the interests of stakeholder groups from dramatic 
reform. In such relatively credible regulatory governance environments, the risks of opportunistic regulations 
being implemented are substantially reduced. 
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Appendix 2: Detailed Survey Results 
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2  Transparency of the PPA 








(1.16)  1.00 
3  Availability of engineering and 








(0.82)  3.00 
4 
Costs for construction, 









(0.47)  3.00 









(0.79)  2.00 
6  Hard long-term government 








(0.99)  3.00 
7  Proximity to equipment 








(0.47)  4.00 
8  Government investment 








(0.48)  3.00 







(0.70)  3.00 
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(1.03)  3.00 
11  Ease of obtaining grid 








(1.10)  1.00 
12 
Availability of transmission 









(0.84)  2.00 
13 
Ease of obtaining 









(1.32)  2.00 









(0.99)  1.00 
15  Coordination between all 








(0.97)  1.00 
Sample Size
16  22  5  6  10  1 











                                                           
i We are grateful for helpful comments and feedback on the paper received from many individuals, including Peter Bettle, Jan 
Carr, Don Dewees, Neil Levine, George Vegh, Mark Winfield, Glen Wright and Michael Wyman. Financial support for this research 
was generously provided by the Ontario Centre of Excellence for Energy. 
ii The shortfall in eventual operational capacity installed in Ontario contrasts with the initial high levels of developer interest, driven in 
part by the significant market potential, at the time of the RES auctions in 2004 and 2005. In total, ten PPAs were initially awarded 
under RES I for about 395 MW of renewable capacity, and nine PPAs were awarded under RES II for about 975 MW of renewable 
capacity. The OPA reported that RES I and II received 41 and 22 bids, respectively, for over 1,000 and 2,000 MW of renewable 
power, making both auctions oversubscribed (Global Power Report, 2004; 2005). RES III awarded six contracts for a total of 492 
MW of wind, although the OPA did not release the final number of bids. RESOP, for its part, awarded nearly 1,500 MW of PPAs 
across all renewable fuels between November 2006 and May 2008, although the program initially targeted only 1,000 MW over a 
ten year period (OPA, 2008b). The difference between capacity awarded and actually installed is accounted for by substantial 
project cancellations, delays and withdrawals. Of RES I wind capacity contracted, 14% (50 MW) was cancelled by developers 
before the operational deadline. Out of RES II wind capacity contracted, 19% (177 MW) was cancelled and 40% (379 MW) was 
delayed beyond the commercial deadline. Opposition from local anti-wind groups, who lobbied against land-use permits at the 
municipal level, may have contributed to some developers’ decisions to abandon planned projects. Difficulties in obtaining approvals 
from government agencies were also reported as accounting for some of the delays. 
iii Calculations based on data available from U.S. Department of Energy (2008) and DSIRE (2008).  
iv Although the RES average rates are those for all renewable fuels (weighted by MW), wind PPAs accounted for 96% of MW 
capacity. 
v This section draws on Holburn and Spiller (2002). 
vi See Ontario Energy Board Act, S.O, 1998, c. 15, Sched. A., s. 27(1) and Electricity Act, S.O. 1998, c. 15, Sched. A., s. 25.32(7). 
vii Green Energy and Green Economy Act, S.O. 2009, Sched. D, s. 1. 
viii Electricity Act, S.O. 1998, c. 15, Sched. A., s. 25.4(5). 
ix Ministers themselves are appointed by the Premier without any obligation to obtain approval from a committee or governing body, 
and may be replaced at any point. This flexibility in political leadership is visible in Ontario’s succession of Ministers of Energy over 
the past two administrations. The Premier of Ontario named four different members of the provincial parliament to the position 
between 2003 and 2008, and combined the Minister of Energy with the Ministry of Infrastructure in 2008. Given the short-term 
nature of appointments, ministers have an incentive to be sensitive to policy views of the Premier. 
x Electricity Act, S.O. 1998, c. 15, Sched. A, 25.30(1). 
xi The postponement notice was posted on the website www.ontarioelectricityrfp.ca on March 10, 2006 but was subsequently 
removed along with the entire website in the fall of 2008. 
xii We extensively tested the survey questions before full implementation with pre-trials on several industry experts from industry 
associations, wind power developers and academia. 
xiii In Appendix 2 we provide more detailed survey results which include responses for different subsets of the respondent sample 
as well as standard deviations. Due to the limited sample size and small ordinal answer scale on the survey questions, we do not 
attempt to ascertain statistical significance of the survey results.  
xiv The PTC is a U.S. Federal-level incentive for wind power projects that awards a tax credit per unit of wind power produced. 
Historically, cycles of PTC renewals and expirations have caused a boom-and-bust cycle in wind installations. 
xv This table was produced with information drawn from a database of 128 wind power projects installed between 1998 and 2007 
(8,303 MW or 55% of wind capacity installed during that period across the US) (EERE, 2008). Figures are U.S. national averages.. 
The prices are those paid to the project owner based on facility commercial operation date, and are thus effectively busbar energy 
prices. Prices generally include interconnection costs, as is the case in Ontario. In order to make raw U.S. and Ontario rates 
comparable we implemented the following adjustments: first, we added federal incentives of U.S. $0.02 Production Tax Credit to 
U.S. rates and CAD $0.01 ecoENERGY credits to Ontario rates, each adjusted to reflect the post-tax benefits (assuming a   
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corporate tax rate of 35% in the U.S.). Second, we converted these adjusted rates into Canadian dollars using average daily 
exchange rates for 2006 and 2007 (88 and 93 cents). We excluded any potential value of renewable energy credits that may accrue 
to developers. 
16 The difference between the respondent numbers in this and the previous table is explained by respondents who answered 
“Not Applicable” to questions on this part of the survey.  